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KAMILA VRÁNKOVÁ
In 1764, Immanuel Kant made an attempt to record his description of mental 
states in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, following the 
Burkean distinction  between the beautiful (which “charms” and arouses joy) and 
the sublime (which “moves” and arouses awe and admiration).1 He sees the sublime 
as great and simple, while the beautiful can be small, ornamented and ephemeral. 
Dealing with human feelings and conduct, the study discusses three kinds of the 
sublime: the noble, the splendid, and the terrifying. In Kant’s concept of the noble, 
the sublime “emerges as an important moral component of the person,”2 being 
linked, in fact, to the idea of categorical imperative. “True virtue” is “sublime” as 
it is based on general, universal principles: “Only when one subordinates his one 
inclination to one so expended can our charitable impulses be used proportionately 
and bring about the noble bearing that is the beauty of virtue.”3
As John T. Goldthwait points out, in asserting the correspondence between 
beauty and virtue, and in connecting the sublime with the dignity of human nature, 
Kant “joins together aesthetics and ethics” (29). In contrast to Shaftsbury, who, in 
assigning sublimity (and the highest virtue) to the deity (the Creator), describes 
sublimity as “unattainable for man,” Kant suggests that it is “man himself ” who 
“exhibits the sublime” (Goldthwait 25).  In this respect, the “dignity of human 
nature uni"es all mankind,” representing the “unity beneath the great diversity,” 
and becomes the ground of the idea that “man himself is sublime” (Goldthwait 
25).
In Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790), the concern with the moral and aesthetic 
aspects of the sublime is grounded less on the principles of conduct than on the 
nature of reason. Moreover, attention is given to the feelings of fear and pain 
as important components of the sublime experience. In contrast to Burke’s 
emphasis on powerlessness, the Kantian fear is “outweighed by pleasure that the 
soul takes in the discovery of the extent of its own powers” (Goldthwait 34). As 
1 Kant, Immanuel, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, transl. by John T. 
Goldthwait, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003, 47.
2 Goldthwait, John T., “Translator’s Introduction,” Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime, 18.
3 Kant, Immanuel, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 60.
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John T. Goldthwait observes, Kant develops his concept of the terrifying sublime 
to associate it with the sublime itself. Unlike the Burkean sublime, dependent 
on senses (it may be observed and felt), the Kantian sublime arises from mental 
activity: it is “not to be looked for in the things of nature, but only in our own 
ideas.”4 In connecting the feeling of sublimity with the human ability to represent 
the sublime in objects, Kant, in fact, supports the ethical dimension of the aesthetic 
experience of the sublime.
Like Burke’s treatise, Kant’s analysis of the sublime focuses on the limits of the 
human experience. Burke, however, refers to the limited (or trapped5) physicality 
of man. Kant reformulates this idea to suggest that sublimity raises us beyond these 
limits towards spiritual greatness. At the same time, it is the concern with the limits 
that leads Kant to con"rm the di#erence between the sublime and the beautiful. 
While the beautiful “consists in limitation” and is derived from the form of an 
object, the sublime involves and provokes a “representation of limitlessness.”6 In this 
respect, it de"es our “power of judgment,” as well as our “faculty of presentation” 
(Kant §23, 76). As a result, it enlarges our “conceptualizing capacity,” which can 
range “beyond the limitations of our sensible "nite nature.”7
In particular, Kant distinguishes between two forms of the sublime: the 
mathematical, connected with the faculty of cognition and the experience of 
vastness, and the dynamical (an “attunement of the imagination”), linked to the 
faculty of desire and the experience of power (Kant §24, 78). In discussing the 
mathematical sublime, Kant de"nes the sublime as something which is “absolutely” 
(i.e. “beyond all comparison”) great,8 which arouses a notion of in"nity, and which 
can be experienced due to the “faculty of mind transcending every standard of 
the senses” (Kant §25, 81). $e analysis of the dynamical sublime draws on man’s 
confrontation with higher forces (religious awe, the power of nature, various forms 
of external violence and threats of destruction), and on the insigni"cance of his 
relation to them.  As Paul Crowther points out, the “knowledge of our sensible 
limitations” (and the psychological state of displeasure or privation), which enables 
us to recognize the object as overwhelming, is “ingrained in us from childhood” 
(150).
In Kant’s interpretation, however, it is the recognition of helplessness that 
becomes a presupposition of greatness: the emphasis is put on the unhumiliated 
4 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment, §25, transl. J.C. Meredith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008, 78.
5 Slocombe, Will, Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern, London & New York: Routledge, 2006, 41.
6 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment, §23, 75.  Italics in the original text.
7 Crowther, Paul, !e Kantian Sublime. From Morality to Art, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 147.
8 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment, §25, 78. Italics in the original text.
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humanity during the encounter with higher forces, on the possibility of a spiritual 
transcendence at the moments of powerlessness, on the concept of adversity as 
a test of virtue. As mentioned above, the inclusion of the moral meaning in the 
experience of the sublime is closely connected with Kant’s concept of imagination. 
While Burke suggests that terror experienced from a position of safety is mingled 
with delight brought about by the feeling of relief, Kant, referring to the same 
position of safety, implies our ability to “imagine ourselves as morally resistant even 
in the face of destruction” (Crowther 148). Moreover, he continues to connect this 
resistance with a real menace and to describe the state of mind that is “above the 
threats of danger” (Kant §28, 93), above the reality of human "nitude and physical 
limitation.
As it is implied in the Critique of Judgment, it is the faculty of imagination that 
produces the unimaginable, which is, for Kant, just another term for the sublime. 
In other words, it is the recognition of the limits that may inspire the idea of the 
unlimited. In attaining its maximum and sinking back into itself, imagination, 
paradoxically, “gains in losing.”9 Paul Crowther speaks about the intensity of this 
experience and points out that “we feel [… ]  to be both imprisoned and liberated 
by the very same force” (150). In this respect, Kant modi"es Burke’s view of 
pleasure and pain as di#erent and separated kinds of experience. In Kantian play 
of imagination and reason, there is a mutual dependence of the two emotions: the 
feeling of momentary checking of the vital powers initiates a “consequent stronger 
out%ow of them”10 and results in what J.-F. Lyotard describes as an “increase of 
being.”11
For an artist, imagination, as a “productive faculty of cognition,” is a powerful 
agent in the process of creation: it can re-model experience in producing the image 
which can surpass nature (Kant §49, 143). $e art of a poet (i.e. his talent of 
imagination) allows him to give the “sensible form to the invisible” (the ideas 
of love and death, heaven and hell), to transgress “the limits of experience” in 
presenting things that “lie beyond the con"nes” of this experience with the 
“completeness of which nature a#ords no parallel” (143). In this respect, the poet, 
through metaphors, creates a bridge between the visible and the invisible, the "nite 
9 Antal, Éva, Beyond Rhetoric. Rhetorical Figures of Reading, Eger: Líceum Kiadó, 2009, 36. Éva Antal 
uses these words to comment on the following passage from Derrida’s analysis of Kant in “Parergon,“ 
!e Truth in Painting: “$e imagination […] by this violent renunciation […] gains in extension 
(Erweiterung) and in power (Macht).“
10 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgment, §23, transl.  J.H. Bernard, London: Macmillan, 1914, 102. 
$is time I prefer quoting from Bernard’s translation here.  
11 Lyotard, J.-F., !e Postmodern Condition, transl. Geo#rey Bennington and Brian Massumi, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, 75.
Kamila Vránková22
and the in"nite, the beautiful and the sublime. Sublimity, in the words of Kant, 
“does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our own mind.” Due to 
this fact, we can realize “our superiority over nature within,” as well as “over nature 
without us” (Kant §28, 94). By moral will, man can be freed from passions and 
desires, he can elevate himself above his natural impulses (e.g. the feeling of fear). 
As Kant puts it, it is through the sublime that nature within man (and around 
man) can be defeated by the supremacy of reason. And it is the transcendence of 
nature through moral law that is the “sole legitimate end of human life.”12
For John Zammito, the sublime is the aesthetic experience which par excellence 
symbolizes the “moral dimension of human existence.”13 In Crowther’s words, 
it promotes our existence as moral beings. Paul Crowther further discusses “the 
potential to comprehend things which far exceed sensible capacities” as a faculty 
common to all men, involving “a spark of the divine” and inviting “our sense of 
respect” for every individual person, which is, for him, a crucial aspect of morality. 
In this respect he "nds Kant’s main contribution to the development of the theory 
of the sublime in his ability to see that “the aesthetic experience – and the sublime 
in particular – has the capacity to humanize” (Crowther 174).
$e description of human nature in terms of tension between the natural and 
the divine as two powerful and opposite forces that can be brought into certain 
harmony by the faculty of imagination can be found in Chris L. Firestone’s analysis 
of Kant and his concept of the “original image” as an ideal that cannot be reached 
within the range of possible experience.14 $e concept of this transcendental ideal 
is linked to the idea of the divine being, a personi"cation of the moral law, a 
guide and a challenge, which, however, can be only approximated in the e#ort to 
overcome the natural limits of human condition. In Paul Crowther’s study, this 
e#ort is connected with the artists’ ability to transform the world through the 
creation of the original image (158).
12 Slocombe, Will, Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern, London & New York: Routledge, 2006, 41. 
13 Zammito, John, !e Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992, 279.
14 Firestone, Chris L., Kant and !eology at the Boundaries of Reason, Farnham, Barlington: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2009, 30-31. 
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$e Kantian idea of the sublime as a bridge joining man (with his desire for 
transcendence) and nature is developed and modi"ed in the Romantic concept 
of sublimity. Philip Shaw points out the role of the German Idealist tradition, 
in particular, of Friedrich Schiller and F.W.J. von Schelling, in the endeavour 
to overcome the split between ideas and nature, and between the extremes of 
rationalism and empiricism. For Schelling, the medium through which mind is 
reunited with nature, and the sensible with the transcendental, can be discovered 
in art: A great work of art raises “the invisible curtain that separates the real from 
the ideal world,” and to the artist, nature is “merely the imperfect re%ection of 
a world that exists not outside but within him.”15 In this respect, poetry, by its 
synthesizing power of imagination, can harmonise “the disparate realms of idea 
and reality, mind and world” (Shaw 92). Responding to Kant’s emphasis on the 
unimaginable, the Romantic poetry “seeks to bring the supersensible back to the 
realm of sensuous presentation,” allowing us, in this way, to “comprehend the 
sublime” (Shaw 92). 
In British Romanticism, the in%uence of Schelling’s revision of Kant is echoed, 
for example, in the works of William Blake, S.T. Coleridge, William Wordsworth, 
P.B. Shelley and John Keats, requesting the primacy of imagination. Coleridge, in 
particular, mentions his being indebted to Kant in Biographia Literaria (1817). 
Considering the role of imagination, however, he tries to overcome the Kantian 
dualism by suggesting that the unity of mind and world can be not only intuited 
but also conceived. In Coleridge’s view, imagination is a “repetition in the "nite 
mind of the eternal act of creation,” (Shaw 93) and is closely related to his theory 
of the symbol. It is through the symbolic presentation that the distinctions 
between words and things, subject and object, self and other, man and God may 
be dissolved. Linked to Coleridge’s concept of (Christian) divinity, the symbol is a 
“literal embodiment” (Shaw 94) of the divine word.
Like Kant, Coleridge distinguishes between the sublime, which is without shape 
or form, and the beautiful, pointing out, moreover, the speci"c role of poetry: 
“Nothing that has a shape can be sublime except by metaphor.”16 In particular, 
Coleridge refers to the famous example of a circle, which is “a beautiful "gure in 
itself ” and which “becomes sublime” when it inspires a contemplation of eternity. 
In other words, a sensuous object cannot be sublime “in itself,” it can evoke the 
sublime only as a “symbol of some Idea” (Shaw 95). From this point of view, 
poetry is more sublime than painting as the notion of sublimity arises from the 
limits of language, i.e. the inability of language to “incarnate meaning in a single 
15 Schelling, F.W.J.,von, as quoted by Philip Shaw, in !e Sublime, New York: Routledge, 2007, 91-92.
16 Coleridge, S.T., as quoted by Philip Shaw, in !e Sublime, 95.
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image” (Shaw 98). As Philips Shaw observes, it is only Coleridge’s sense of the 
divine (and the concept of the sublime as a mode of elevation) that distinguishes 
him from the poststructuralist theories.
According to J.B. Twitchell, whose study Romantic Horizons searches for the 
correspondence between particular Romantic paintings and poems (Blake, 
Wordsworth and Wright, Coleridge and Turner, Byron and Martin, Keats and 
Cozens, Shelley and Constable), the Romantic sublime draws on the spatial images 
and on the line of horizon. He o#ers an example of a pastoral scene: what can be 
seen “between the middle ground and the background” can be picturesque, and 
what can be seen “between the background and the beyond” is the sublime.17 As 
”nature up too close” (Twitchell 8) may con"ne the self, the Romantic attention 
is "xed at the vastness of the sky and the expanses of the sea, in particular, at the 
boundary where earth and sky meet, the boundary that points to what lies beyond, 
inviting and allowing the extension of the self. $us the distance between the 
“outer” and the “beyond” re%ects a gap between the “inner” and the “outer,” man 
and nature, the subject and the object; the loss of the unity that cannot be resolved 
but through the mediation of the sublime. As Twitchell points out, the “whole 
logic” of the (Romantic) sublime is “based on an attempt to join what Locke had 
rent asunder – to join subject and object, if only for a moment” (40).
Will Slocombe’s discussion implies a connection between this separation and 
the repeated use of abysmal imagery in Romantic poetry to suggest that it is the 
notion of absence that characterises the threshold experience in the Romantic 
sublime (Slocombe 47). As Slocombe observes, the feelings of emptiness, solitude 
and loss are pointed out in Weiskel’s linguistic analysis of the sublime: the sublime 
can be felt at “that moment when the relation between the signi"er and signi"ed 
breaks down and is replaced by an indeterminate relation.”18 For Weiskel, the 
failure of representation (or, “the disruption of the discourse”) may result from 
an excess of either “the signi"er”/”the object” (Kant’s mathematical sublime), or 
“the signi"ed”/”the mind” (the abysmal imagery). $e object of fear (e.g. death) 
may be displaced or projected, for example, into an image of an empty landscape 
(Weiskel 26-27).
17 Twitchell, J.B., Romantic Horizons, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1983, 8. 
18 Weiskel, $omas, !e Romantic Sublime, Foreword, ix., Baltimore and London: $e Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976. 
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Accordingly, the critics dealing with the history of the sublime (for instance, 
Slocombe) develop the idea that the language of sublimity is concerned with what 
is beyond words, with the inexplicable, the inexpressible and the unspeakable. 
In this respect, the “absence of a signi"ed itself assumes the status of a signi"er” 
as it makes absence (i.e. indeterminacy) signi"cant.19 Paul H. Fry connects this 
uncertainty with the transformation of the divine into otherness, with the widening 
gap between self-understanding and the understanding of another.20
For Weiskel, a characteristic example of the Romantic sublime (i.e. the experience 
of perceiving all things as an extension of the self, when the excess of the signi"ed 
is displaced into a spatial or temporal dimension) can be found in William 
Wordsworth’s sublimity of nature;21 Weiskel also uses such alternative terms as the 
egotistical,22 the positive, or the metonymical sublime. As Adam Pathay observes, 
Weiskel "nds the psychoanalytical equivalent of the Romantic sublime in “primary 
narcissism.”23 In contrast, Kant’s sublime is considered by Weiskel as metaphorical, 
or negative sublime: it results in the individual losing his unique self, either in 
reason (the mathematical sublime) or in “attempted empathy with an external 
object,” for instance, in  Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale” (Pathay 208).
$omas Weiskel, in his dealing with the psychology of the sublime, refers to 
identity as an “inverse function of desire” and emphasizes the interrelationship of 
desire and memory (148, 154). Drawing on Freud’s study !e Problem of Anxiety 
(1926) and explaining the child’s fear of separation, he states that the original 
anxiety linked by him to the negative sublime springs from the notion of absence, 
which is, in other words, a “lack of being,” urging “the ego to over%ow towards 
objects” (Weiskel 160). When the attachment to objects “exceeds a certain degree,” 
the state of dependence may result in illness or madness; Edmund Burke’s idea of 
“the mind that is so entirely "lled with its object that it cannot entertain any other”24 
can be remembered here. On the other hand, the importance of objects consists in 
their o#ering the possibility of transcendence through an act of imagination. 
19 Weiskel 28. In Weiskel, this idea is referred to Kant’s regarding “unattainability” as “presentation.” 
In Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights, for example, it is this absence that dramatizes the relationship 
between Catherine and Heathcli#.  
20 Fry, Paul H., “$e Possession of the Sublime, Studies in Romanticism, 26.2 (1987), 191. 
21 See Weiskel, !e Romantic Sublime, 136-64.
22 $is term was used by John Keats in 1818 as an interpretation of Wordsworth’s poetry.
23 Pathay, Adam, “$e British Romantic Sublime,“ in !e Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. 
Timothy M. Costelloe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 208. 
24 Burke, Edmund, A Philosophical Enquiry, ed. Adam Phillips, Oxford: OUP, 1998, 53.
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As David Simpson shows, the traditional signatures of excess, overdetermination, 
and threatened loss of self-identity appear in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
in particular, in Freud’s distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, and 
in his de"nition of the unconscious as alien.25 Philip Shaw observes a connection 
between the discourse of psychoanalysis and Kant’s interest in the transcendence of 
desire (85). $e freedom of the individual, paradoxically, depends on his willingness 
to submit to a higher authority (the faculty of reason), and, accordingly, individual 
desires should submit to the categorical imperative. $is ethics of disinterest, 
however, may lead to the devaluation of desire into the point of indi#erence (Shaw 
85-86).
According to $omas Weiskel, the drama of the sublime is a “direct inheritance 
from the Oedipus-complex” (93). In particular, Weiskel emphasizes the 
confrontation with the father-principle (or with its absence) in a passage towards 
or away from self-identity.26 As he observes, it is the liminal phase of the passage 
(the moment of crossing the threshold into the realm of the supersensible, in other 
words, the moment of encounter with the father-principle) that is "lled with terror 
accompanying the “suppression of the narcissistic self-consciousness associated with 
perception” (Weiskel 201). $e Kantian imagination, in this respect, functions as a 
rejection of the Oedipus complex.27
$e Gothic "ction, on the one hand, repeatedly deals with the (Burkean) absence 
of paternal authority as privation (the death of parents) or as an extreme example 
of destructive power (the monster father "gures), which both complicates and 
urges the search for identity (the motifs of disguises, the unknown or uncertain 
origins, an increase of vulnerability in danger), and which is later developed and 
dramatised in children’s and young-adult fantasy. From another point of view, the 
perverted father-like characters (the Gothic villains) acquire signi"cant demoniac 
attributes. It was the Byronic hero, however, who (as James Kirwan puts it) “made 
the sublimity of Satan available to all.”28 In Weiskel’s analysis, the absent centre of 
the self is, in fact, related to the “pattern of overidenti"cation,” which is, according 
25 Simpson, David, “Commentary: Updating the Sublime,” Studies in Romanticism, 26.2 (1987), 246.
26 Weiskel 164. Drawing on Weiskel’s study, Will Slocombe characterises nihilism as a response to the 
rejection or absence of the authority which may be related to the discussed father-principle; the 
rejection which is repeatedly echoed in the Romantic poetry.   
27 Weiskel 203. As Weiskel observes, this rejection may be only illusory as it does not mean the 
disappearance or the dissolution of the Oedipus principle.
28 Kirwan, James, Sublimity: !e Non-Rational and the Irrational in the History of Aesthetics, New York 
and London: Routledge, 2005, 120.
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to him, the “psychological source of the daemonic”29 in Romanticism. Or, as Paul 
H. Fry puts it, “what we once feared we now are” (196).
Referring to Longinus’s reciprocity of possession (the overwhelming power of the 
speaker results in the listener’s illusory internalisation of what he has heard, as if he 
had produced it himself ), Fry discusses the anxiety of in%uence30 as an important 
force that leads the self to seek and assert its origin, i.e., which “makes the self the 
daemon”31 (or, an absolute self32). An example of a vampire motif is employed to 
suggest that to repress a daemon the self may take over his role. Considering the 
Romantic sublimity as a problem of power, James Kirwan, together with Martin 
Procházka, comes to a conclusion that whatever can threaten to overwhelm, from 
God to Satan, “can precipitate the sublime” (Kirwan 165). 
As James Kirwan observes, it is the notion of power that permeates the idea of 
greatness in the 19th-century American philosophy of the sublime.  In the work of 
R.W. Emerson, a speci"c concept of the moral sublime is developed, which is, in a 
way, connected with the religious tradition of New England. For Emerson (as well 
as for his followers, $oreau or Whitman), it is the soul (the self ) that is sublime, 
while the sublimity of landscape33  is its “appropriate re%ection.”34 American 
transcendentalism, echoing the ideas of Kant, Wordsworth and Coleridge, draws 
on “the emotion of the sublime” in “an in%ux of the Divine mind into our mind,”35 
in the feeling of “enthusiasm” accompanying the spiritual state of “awakening” 
(Emerson 915).
29 Weiskel 99.  At the beginning of his study, Weiskel refers to Schiller’s description of Kant’s sublime, 
in particular, of “reason’s disclosure of capacities beyond the understanding’s horizon,“ which has the 
character of a “pure daemon“ (!e Romantic Sublime, 3).
30 $e term refers to Harold Bloom’s study !e Anxiety of In"uence: A !eory of Poetry (1973).
31 Fry, 196-97. Cf. also $omas Weiskel’s treatment of ambition as a desire for originality, i.e. the desire 
to escape imitation through identi"cation with the object, e.g. nature or a text (!e Romantic Sublime, 
99). Moreover, Weiskel observes that in Burke’s Enquiry it is a section on “ambition” (following a 
section on “imitation”) where Burke’s only reference to Longinus (in particular, Longinus’s concern 
with identi"cation between the speaker and the listener) appears. 
32 $e term is used in Will Slocombe’s Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern, 47.
33 Kirwan 128. Kirwan quotes Emerson’s reference to the “sublime geography“ of the continent, or 
Montague’s depiction of the “magni"cent“ landscape, leading her to the conclusion that “sublimity is 
the characteristic of this western world“ (Sublimity, 128).
34 Cf. Emerson’s description of nature as a “symbol of spirit” (“Nature,” in !e Norton Anthology of 
American Literature, Vol.1, New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979, 911). 
35 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, “$e Over-Soul,” in !e Norton Anthology of American Literature, Vol.1, New 
York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979, 973-84.
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In particular reminiscence to 18th-century Puritanism (Jonathan Edwards and 
the  movement of the Great Awakening as a religious response to the rational spirit 
of the Enlightenment), Emerson frequently uses the term awakening to describe 
the emotional and intuitional perception of reality; he points out, however, the 
individual recognition of one’s (instead of God’s) “higher powers.” In his famous 
essay “Nature” (1836), the moments of such “delicious awakenings” are considered 
the best moments in life: the moments of “depth,” the moments containing “more 
reality” than other (everyday) kinds of experience, the moments when the “pictures 
of time […] fade in the light of their meaning sublime” (Emerson 916).
H.D. $oreau, who in his Walden (1854) describes the way to realise Emerson’s 
ideas by simplifying one’s life to the point of harmony with nature, metaphorically 
expresses the same experience as a “morning” of the mind: “Morning is when I 
am awake and there is a dawn in me.”36 Like Emerson, $oreau considers “the 
unquestionable ability of [every] man to elevate his life by a conscious endeavour,” 
and points out the value of art and poetry as a result of the highest elevation 
and full awakening (“only one in a hundred millions” is “awake enough” to “a 
poetic or divine life”37). Moreover, in Emerson’s Over-soul (1841), the emotions 
of the sublime are connected with the experience of “revelation,” in other words, 
“perceptions of the absolute law” (978).
As James Kirwan sums it up, in American transcendentalism sublimity is made 
a “standard of truth.”38 In the experience of “the eternal One” (Emerson 978), that 
is, in the mingling of the individual soul with the great, universal soul), God is not 
what we can intimate but what we can become. In this respect, Kirwan mentions 
the democratic character of Emerson’s sublime (suggested also in Whitman’s poetry, 
for instance, in “$e Song of Myself ”), which is available to all: “$e simplest 
person, who in his integrity [that is, the unity with nature] worships God, becomes 
God” (Emerson 982). 
36 $oreau, Henry David, Walden, ed. J. Lyndon Shanley, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, 
90.
37 $oreau 90. Cf. Emerson’s idea that the work of art can help us to reach “Paradise” “by the stairway 
of surprise,” expressed in the poem “Merlin,” 1846 (!e Norton Anthology of American Literature, 
Vol.1, 1056). In “$e Over-Soul,” Longinus’s concern with the reciprocity of the sublime is echoed in 
the statement that “the great poet makes us feel our own wealth” (!e Norton Anthology of American 
Literature, Vol.1, 981). 
38 Kirwan, James, Sublimity, 129. Cf. Emerson’s “$e Over-Soul,” in !e Norton Anthology of American 
Literature, Vol.1, 979.
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Considering the power relations in the experience of the sublime, Kirwan 
draws an interesting parallel between Emerson’s “great soul” (“$e Over-Soul,” 
“Self-Reliance”) and the idea of “the overman” (“the Übermensch”) as a goal for 
humanity in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. $ough Nietzsche (like Emerson) 
does not develop a particular theory of the sublime, he deserves, according to 
Kirwan, “a key place in a history of the sublime in the nineteenth century” (131). 
Frequently alluded to with the adjective “higher,” the sublime repeatedly appears 
in Nietzsche’s early work, in%uenced by Romanticism. In !e Birth of Tragedy, for 
example, he contrasts “the terrors of individual existence” (evoked by the reality 
of inevitable destruction) with a liberating notion (inspired by art, and tragedy in 
particular), that “everything which exists is a unity.”39
In Nietzsche’s later work, as Kirwan observes, the sublime coincides with greatness 
and strength, entering also the traditional rhetorical context: “of what is great, 
one must be silent or speak with greatness.”40 Moreover, Nietzsche’s philosophical 
concepts of “eternal recurrence” or the “will to power” can also be associated with 
the sublime (Kirwan 132-133). While strength, according to Nietzsche, allows to 
conquer nature, identi"cation with nature is connected with weakness; and it is “in 
the enhancement of the feeling of power” that “the criterion of truth” can be found 
(Nietzsche §534, 290). As Will Slocombe puts it, nihilism draws on the Romantic 
rejection of “absolute truths,” on the absence of authority, and on the “proposition 
of a ‘natural’ humanism” and ‘divine’ scepticism” (49). $e “shift of emphasis from 
rhetoric to psychology to rationality” in the concepts of the sublime, following 
the shift from religion to secularism and pointing out the problem of identity, 
anticipates, in fact, the attitudes of existentialism and postmodernism (Slocombe 
49).
39 Nietzsche, Friedrich, as quoted by James Kirwan, in Sublimity, 132.
40 Nietzsche, Friedrich, !e Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, transl. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale, New York, 1967, §1, 3.
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